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GENERAL

S/23093
30 September 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government and further to our letters concerning Iraq's violations of the terms of the cease-fire, I have the honour to report 17 such violations by Iraqi forces in August 1991.

1. On 8 August 1991, Iraqi forces used the existing bunker at the geographic coordinates of 571-402 on the map of Sumar as an ambush bunker.

2. On 9 August 1991, Iraqi forces set up six group tents and shades at the geographic coordinates of 536-446 on the map of Sumar.

3. On 10 August 1991, at 0140 hours, several Iraqi soldiers were observed around the geographic coordinates of 709-232 on the map of Halaleh. They were forced to retreat by Iranian border guards.

4. On 11 August 1991, at 0955 hours, an Iraqi tank was observed at the geographic coordinates of 439-676 on the map of Naft Shahr.

5. On 11 August 1991, at 1200 hours, five Iraqi soldiers were observed digging a channel at the geographic coordinates of 716-226 on the map of Halaleh.

6. On 11 August 1991, at 0800 hours, seven Iraqi soldiers were observed digging a channel at the geographic coordinates of 980-960 on the map of Meimeh.

7. On 11 August 1991, at 2000 hours, 10 Iraqi soldiers with full military equipment were observed at the geographic coordinates of 539-247 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

8. On 13 August 1991, at 0945 hours, an Iraqi loader was observed blocking the asphalt road and constructing an embarkment at the geographic coordinates of 432-659 on the nap of Naft Shahr.

9. On 13 August 1991, at 1004 hours, six Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing an observation post and digging a channel at the geographic coordinates of 716-224 on the map of Halaleh.

10. On 13 August 1991, at 2300 hours, several Iraqi patrolmen infiltrated into the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the geographic coordinates of 673-240 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin. Following the reaction of Iranian border guards, they were forced to retreat.

11. On 17 August 1991, five Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a bunker at the geographic coordinates of 710-221 on the map of Halaleh.

12. On 20 August 1991, at 1130 hours, five Iraqi vehicles equipped with Dush-K were observed stationed at the geographic coordinates of 291-821 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

13. On 21 August 1991, at 1245 hours, Iraqi forces were observed setting mines at 10 different locations on the road at the geographic coordinates of 435-651 on the map of Naft Shahr.

14. On 21 August 1991, at 1800 hours, five Iraqi forces were observed constructing bunkers at the geographic coordinates of 70-21 on the map of Chazabeh.

15. On 29 August 1991, two Iraqi soldiers approached the Iranian forces at the geographic coordinates of 649-229 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

16. On 30 August 1991, at 0850 hours, several Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing an observation post at the geographic coordinates of 445-685 on the map of Naft Shahr.

17. On 30 August 1991, at 0700 hours, 10 Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a shade at the geographic coordinates of 624-248 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/23094
30 September 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 29 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, and further to our previous letters concerning Iranian violations of the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran, I should like to point out further occurrences of Iranian violations, as follows:

1. At 0800 hours on 4 September 1991, a military helicopter was seen approaching from the Iranian rear. It landed at coordinates 459641 in the central sector (map of Khanaqin), and five military personnel alighted from it. At 1000 hours, the aircraft took off in the direction of the Iranian rear with the persons on board.

2. At 0830 hours on 6 September 1991, two excavators and a Land Cruiser pick-up vehicle carrying seven persons were seen opening a new road from the Iranian rear to the new Iranian position at coordinates 901025 opposite the Zayd guard post in the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

3. At 0900 hours on 6 September 1991, 12 persons from the Iranian side were seen digging personnel positions within the Suqaynid strongpoint at coordinates 588236 inside the area of separation in the central sector (map of Qasr-e-Shirin).

4. On the night of 6/7 September 1991, the Iranian side constructed an earth rampart in front of the new Iranian position at coordinates 901025 in the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

5. At 1900 hours on 7 September 1991, 10 persons from the Iranian side proceeded to dig two positions and to install two 120-mm mortars at coordinates 535982 inside the area of separation in the central sector (map of Kani Bazz).

6. At 1930 hours on 7 September 1991, two persons from the Iranian side wearing civilian clothing proceeded to fire a number of rounds from the Iranian Bahramanabad guard post at coordinates 009645 on the map of Zurbatiyah in the central sector in the direction of the Iraqi Al-Hasan al-Askari guard post in the same sector.

7. At 0815 hours on 8 September 1991, 35 Iranian soldiers proceeded to install a barbed wire obstacle around the Iranian position at coordinates 899302 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri). At 0930 hours on the same day, the Iranian side proceeded to dig a trench and to build an earth rampart around the Iranian position at coordinates 903259 inside the area of separation in the same sector.

8. Between 0930 and 1000 on 10 September 1991, the Iranian side proceeded to shell the positions of the Iraqi units in the Turabah area at coordinates 413865 in the southern sector (map of Baydah) using an 82-mm mortar. The number of shells that fell was four.

9. At 1210 hours on 11 September 1991, a Mercedes dump truck carrying four concrete sections was seen. The sections were unloaded at the Iranian position at coordinates 899273 inside the area of separation in the southern sector. At 1600 hours on the same day, four persons from the Iranian side were observed installing a 106-mm gun at coordinates 535982 to the east of Zayn al-Qaws inside the area of separation in the central sector (map of Kani Bazz).

10. At 0945 hours on 12 September 1991, the Iranian side proceeded to build a position of prefabricated concrete sections at coordinates 899234 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

11. At 0645 hours on 13 September 1991, 15 persons from the Iranian side were observed digging a 25 to 30-metre-long communications trench at coordinates 427567 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Shaykh Faris).

12. At 1735 hours on 14 September 1991, the Iranian side proceeded to build a position and to plant a new flag at coordinates 908787 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

13. At 2000 hours on 15 September 1991, the Iranian side proceeded to build a new observation post manned by six persons in the area of the Bubiyan guard post at coordinates 905893 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

14. At 1600 hours on 18 September 1991, four persons from the Iranian side wearing military uniforms were observed coming from their positions at coordinates 604374 in the central sector (map of Mandali) to old and abandoned positions at coordinates 603362 inside the area of separation in the same sector. They proceeded to throw five hand grenades close to the abandoned positions.

15. At 0730 hours on 19 September 1991, some 13 to 15 persons from the Iranian side proceeded to construct a new position opposite crossing-point No. 4 at coordinates 912792 (Shalamcheh area) inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

16. At 0945 hours on 20 September 1991, the Iranian side proceeded to build a concrete position at coordinates 912031 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

17. At 0950 hours on 20 September 1991, persons from the Iranian side were observed surfacing and improving the road from coordinates 931288 to coordinates 902286 and 899302 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

18. At 0955 hours on 20 September 1991, the Iranian side proceeded to build a fortified observation post at coordinates 111698 inside the area of separation in the central sector (map of Zurbatiyah).

19. At 1940 hours on 20 September 1991, the Iranian side proceeded to build an observation post at coordinates 917816 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

20. At 0800 hours on 21 September 1991, the Iranian side proceeded to build a concrete position at coordinates 912069 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

21. At 1730 hours on 21 September 1991, seven persons from the Iranian side were observed laying barbed wire along the road leading to the Fayruz Khan bridge at coordinates 541232 inside the area of separation in the central sector (map of Qasr-e-Shirin).

22. At 1730 hours on 22 September 1991, 10 persons from the Iranian side were observed building a position at coordinates 909810 inside the area of separation in the southern sector (map of Tahiri).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/23095
30 September 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

I

1. United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi airspace for purposes of surveillance and provocation. On 26/27 September 1991, a total of 24 sorties were carried out flown by nine two-aircraft formations, one three-aircraft formation and three solo aircraft at speeds of 700 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes ranging from 2,500 to 20,000 metres. Air activity was concentrated over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Rawanduz, Zakho, Sanjaz and Tall'afar.

2. At 0945 hours local time, on 26 September 1991, an aircraft violated Iraqi airspace from the direction of Kuwait, south of Artawi airfield, to a distance of 10 kilometres and at a low speed of 180 kilometres per hour.

II

1. On 27/28 September 1991, United States aircraft continued their violation of Iraqi airspace for purposes of surveillance and provocation by means of 23 sorties flown by 14 two-aircraft formations and one four-aircraft formation flying at speeds of 600 to 720 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,500 to 8,000 metres.

2. United States air activity was concentrated over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Tall'afar, Farwiya, Zakho, Rawanduz, Dukan and Ayn Zalah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-32066 2630g (E)

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/23096
30 September 1991
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace as follows:

1. On 28/29 September 1991, United States air activity amounted to 29 sorties flown by 10 two-aircraft formations, one six-aircraft formation and three solo aircraft at speeds of 600 to 720 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 6,000 metres.

2. Air activity was concentrated over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Tall'afar, Amadiyah, Zakho and Rawanduz for purposes of surveillance and provocation.

3. At 1030 hours, two F-16 aircraft flew over Tall'afar airfield (Faruq) at a speed of 720 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 200 metres.

4. At 1215 hours, a six-aircraft formation consisting of four F-16s and two F-15s flew over Tall'afar airfield (Faruq) at a speed of 500 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 100 metres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-32072 2558c (E)

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S/23097
30 September 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON CAMBODIA

INTRODUCTION

1. In my letter of 8 August 1991 to the President of the Security Council (S/22945), I stated that it was my intention to proceed with the necessary arrangements for the dispatch of a survey mission to Cambodia as soon as possible. In his reply dated 14 August 1991 (S/22946), the President of the Security Council informed me that the members of the Council agreed with the proposal contained in my letter.

2. The purpose of the present report, which has been prepared in the light of the survey mission's report, is to recommend to the Security Council that it authorize the establishment of a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which would assume its functions as soon as the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict is signed. Negotiations on the draft Agreement, the text of which was communicated to the Secretary-General by the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia on 8 January 1991 (S/22059), are now at an advanced stage, and it is envisaged that the Agreement will be signed around the end of October 1991.

I. REPORT OF THE SURVEY MISSION

3. The mandate of the survey mission was to evaluate the modalities of control and an appropriate number of United Nations personnel to control the cease-fire and the cessation of outside military assistance and to submit recommendations for the establishment of a mine-awareness programme in Cambodia, pursuant to the requests of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia conveyed to me on 16 and 17 July 1991 by His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, President of the Supreme National Council. The mission was also instructed to bear in mind the communiqué dated 18 July 1991 of the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the permanent members of the Security Council (S/22889, annex).

4. The mission was led by my Military Adviser, Major-General Timothy Dibuama, and consisted of six military officers made available by Member States and six

civilian staff members of the Secretariat. The mission visited the region from 19 August to 4 September 1991, after which it returned to New York to prepare its report.

5. The main points in the mission's report are as follows:

(a) The modalities for the control of the cease-fire and the cessation of outside military assistance have already been worked out and are described in annex 2 to the draft Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement prepared by the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the permanent members of the Security Council (S/22059);

(b) In order to evaluate the appropriate number of United Nations personnel to implement those modalities, it would be necessary to obtain all the information referred to in article I, paragraph 3, and article VII, paragraph 3, of that annex;

(c) Certain of the Cambodian parties informed the mission that they were not at that stage ready to provide to the United Nations some of the information that would be required, and the mission was not in a position to obtain other necessary information;

(d) As a result, it was not possible for the mission to evaluate the modalities for the control of the cease-fire and the cessation of outside military assistance. The mission was also unable to begin concrete preparations for the implementation of the military aspects of the mandate foreseen for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) once a comprehensive agreement is concluded;

(e) As regards the mine-awareness programme, the mission concluded that it should initially be concentrated in the north-western part of Cambodia and areas likely to be resettled by refugees on their return;

(f) Such a programme could best be provided by a small team of military personnel, who would form part of the proposed advance mission.

II. UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE MISSION IN CAMBODIA

6. At the consultations on Cambodia that took place in New York on 20 and 21 September 1991, I informed the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the permanent members of the Security Council that, initially, the United Nations could assist the Cambodian parties to maintain the present cease-fire by deploying in Cambodia a small advance mission consisting mainly of military liaison officers in order to help them to address and resolve any violations or alleged violations of the cease-fire. Such an advance mission could be envisaged as the first stage of the good offices mechanism foreseen in the second paragraph of article 9 of the draft Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.

7. This information was welcomed at the New York consultations and it was suggested that I should proceed with the development of a plan along those lines. Accordingly, I recommend that the Security Council should now decide to authorize the establishment of UNAMIC on the basis described in the following paragraphs.

8. UNAMIC would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. The mission would be led in the field by a civilian Chief Liaison Officer, appointed by the Secretary-General, who would exercise authority over all elements of UNAMIC. Command of the military elements of UNAMIC would be entrusted to a Senior Military Liaison Officer designated by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Senior Military Liaison Officer would report to the Secretary-General through the Chief Liaison Officer. The Secretary-General would report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of UNAMIC. All matters that might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Mission would be referred to the Security Council for its decision.

9. UNAMIC would consist of civilian liaison staff, military liaison officers, a military mine-awareness unit and the necessary support personnel, who would mostly be civilian but could include some military. The military personnel of UNAMIC, who would be unarmed, would be provided by Member States at the request of the Secretary-General. The contributing countries would be selected in consultation with the parties and with the concurrence of the Security Council, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation.

10. The Mission would become operational immediately after the signature of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. The duration of the Mission's mandate would extend from the signature of the Agreement until the establishment of UNTAC by the Security Council and the adoption of its budget by the General Assembly. At that time, UNAMIC would be absorbed into UNTAC, and the good offices functions being carried out by UNAMIC would be continued and expanded by UNTAC during the first phase of the cease-fire referred to in article I, paragraph 1, of annex 2 to the draft Comprehensive Settlement Agreement. It is expected that UNAMIC will merge into UNTAC less than six months after the signature of the Agreement; in case of delay the mandate for UNAMIC might need to be extended beyond six months, subject to review by the Security Council at that time.

11. In addition to his responsibilities in relation to UNAMIC, the Chief Liaison Officer, assisted by the civilian liaison staff, would have responsibility for liaison with the Supreme National Council on the preparations for the deployment of UNTAC and on other matters related to the role of the United Nations in the implementation of the Comprehensive Political Settlement Agreement.

12. The task of the military component of UNAMIC, in its good offices role, would be to facilitate communications between the military headquarters of the

four Cambodian parties in matters relating to the cease-fire. To that end, UNAMIC would establish its headquarters in Phnom Penh and would deploy liaison teams to the general military headquarters of each of the Cambodian parties. It would have its own communications network linking its headquarters and the five liaison teams. It would use its good offices, including the passing of messages between the parties and arranging meetings between them, in order to resolve difficulties, restore the status quo and determine measures to be taken to avoid any recurrence of violations.

13. In addition to his responsibilities in relation to the military elements of UNAMIC, the Senior Military Liaison Officer would undertake the tasks foreseen in article II of annex 2 to the Comprehensive Political Settlement Agreement. The Mixed Military Working Group referred to in that article would be used, as appropriate, to facilitate fulfilment of the tasks of the military component of UNAMIC.

14. In its mine-awareness role, UNAMIC would deploy small teams of military personnel with experience in training civilian populations on how to avoid injury from mines or booby traps. Initially, the teams would give priority to populations living in or close to areas of recent military confrontation. In due course, this initial programme would be expanded into those foreseen in the draft Comprehensive Political Settlement Agreement, giving priority, in consultation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas. UNAMIC activities in this field would need to be carefully coordinated with the mine-awareness programme begun earlier in 1991 for Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in the camps along the Cambodia/Thailand border and with an information programme inside Cambodia which is to be launched shortly by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

15. In order to carry out the above tasks, UNAMIC would need to be assured of the cooperation, at all times, of all the Cambodian parties. It would have to have freedom of movement and communication and the other rights and facilities that would be necessary for the performance of its tasks. UNAMIC and its personnel would also have to be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In order to confirm the commitment of all the Cambodian Parties to undertake the necessary steps to enable UNAMIC to carry out its functions, I would initiate consultations on a draft Agreement on the usual lines with the Supreme National Council as soon as the Security Council had taken the decision to authorize the establishment of UNAMIC. It would also be necessary to conclude with the Government of Thailand an agreement on the status of UNAMIC personnel whose duties might require them to enter that country.

16. It is estimated that in order to carry out the mandate recommended in the present report, UNAMIC would require 8 civilian liaison staff, 50 military liaison officers, 20 other military personnel to form the mine-awareness unit, and approximately 75 international and 75 local civilian support staff. In addition, a military communications unit of some 40 persons could be provided

by Australia as a voluntary contribution. An air unit of four utility helicopters and one fixed-wing aircraft would also be needed.

17. I would envisage that UNAMIC would be deployed progressively and in phases. In the first phase, the Chief Liaison Officer, with the Senior Military Liaison Officer and his staff, certain civilian advisory and administrative staff and the necessary support and logistic elements, would be deployed to Phnom Penh within 10 days of the signature of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement. The second phase would take place as soon as the necessary vehicles, generators, accommodation, etc. had been procured and delivered to the general military headquarters of each of the Cambodian parties, whereupon the military liaison teams would be deployed together with the necessary administrative and support elements. As soon as possible thereafter, the mine-awareness unit would be deployed.

18. I shall, as soon as possible, submit a statement of the financial and administrative implications of this recommendation as an addendum to the present report. Meanwhile, it is my duty to inform the Security Council that, given the ravaged state of Cambodia's economy and infrastructure, it would be possible to obtain in Cambodia almost none of the equipment, supplies and services that the Mission would need. United Nations-provided support elements would inevitably, therefore, have to be extensive. It would also be necessary to send by air-freight to Cambodia a limited amount of the vehicles, communications, accommodation, generators, etc., required for the first phases of deployment.

III. CONCLUSION

19. Recent weeks have seen encouraging progress towards completion of the negotiations on a comprehensive political settlement to the long and cruel conflict in Cambodia. The international community is unanimous in wanting to see that process brought to an early and successful conclusion. I am convinced that the deployment of the advance mission recommended in the present report would help to maintain the momentum and reduce the risk of the process being disturbed by untoward developments in Cambodia. It would also demonstrate the determination of the United Nations to help the Cambodian parties and people resolve their differences in a peaceful and democratic manner.

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30 September 1991

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON CAMBODIA

Addendum

1. In my report to the Security Council (S/23097), I indicated in paragraph 18 that I would submit, as an addendum to the report, a statement of the financial and administrative implications related to the establishment of a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).

2. The mandate of UNAMIC is discussed in the above-referenced report. An outline of the operational plan, general assumptions and cost estimates are provided below. In respect of the financing of the Mission, if established by the Security Council, I recommend that its full cost be considered as expenses of the organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. I intend to recommend to the General Assembly that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a special account that would be established for this purpose.

Operational plan

3. UNAMIC would establish its headquarters at Phnom Penh and would deploy liaison teams to the General Military Headquarters of each of the Cambodian parties. In addition, the Mission would deploy teams in two forward positions, namely Battambang and Siem Reap. The latter locations would also be main bases of activities relating to the mine awareness programme. Consequently, UNAMIC would operate from six locations in the country and would have the capacity to respond rapidly to requirements elsewhere as might be required by its mandate.

4. UNAMIC would require an effective and independent round-the-clock communications system which, in addition, would be open to the Cambodian parties concerned so as to facilitate communications between them as may be necessary to resolve any difficulties that could affect the maintenance of the cease-fire.

5. UNAMIC would function as an integrated operation under the overall responsibility in the field of the Chief Liaison Officer. Following is the summary of the main operational elements:

(a) Office of the Chief Liaison Officer headquartered at Phnom Penh, comprising eight international staff;

(b) Military Unit led by the Senior Military Liaison Officer with a strength of 70, consisting of 50 military liaison officers and 20 other military personnel to form the mine awareness unit. In addition, a unit of 40 military personnel would provide in-theatre communications for the operation. This unit would be provided by the Government of Australia as a voluntary contribution. This generous offer of the Government of Australia would allow for a more rapid deployment of personnel and for surface shipment in lieu of the more costly air lifting of most of the communications and heavy equipment required by the operation;

(c) A Civilian Unit consisting of approximately 75 international personnel and 75 local staff to provide support and technical services, including security, interpretation and translations and medical services. A detailed staffing table is provided in annex I to the present document;

(d) In view of the state of Cambodia's infrastructure, the provision at an early stage of an air unit would permit a rapid and secure deployment of Mission personnel, the establishment of the necessary supply lines as well as medical evacuation.

General assumptions

6. I have already informed the Security Council in my report (S/23097) that given the ravaged state of Cambodia's economy and infrastructure it will be nearly impossible to obtain in Cambodia the equipment, supplies and services that the Mission will need. Consequently, the financial implications take into account the necessity of providing extensive equipment and services from outside Cambodia.

7. UNAMIC would be deployed in two stages. The first group would be deployed immediately after the signature of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement (tentatively scheduled for the end of October 1991) and before 14 November 1991. In a second stage, UNAMIC would achieve full deployment between mid-November and mid-December 1991.

Cost estimates

8. Based on the operational plan and general assumptions outlined above, it is estimated that an amount of $US 19.9 million (gross) would be required for a six-month period of operation. This amount includes the costs of start up and acquisition of capital equipment. Cost estimates broken down by major objects of expenditures are provided in annex II to the present document.

Annex I

Provisional staffing table a/

	Military personnel		Professional category and above		Field Service/ General Service personnel		Local level personnel		Total	
Substantive element										
Head of Mission			(1)	1					(1)	1
Senior political officer			(1)	1					(1)	1
Political/legal officer			(1)	1					(1)	1
Public information officer			(1)	1					(1)	1
Research assistant					(1)	1			(1)	1
Secretaries					(3)	3			(3)	3
Total substantive staff	0	0	(4)	4	(4)	4	0	0	(8)	8
Military element										
Military liaison officers	(17)	50							(17)	50
Mine-awareness personnel		20								20
Medical personnel	(3)	6							(3)	6
Military support b/	(40)	40							(40)	40
Total military element	(60)	116	0	0	0	0	0	0	(60)	116

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	Military personnel	Professional category and above	Field Service/ General Service personnel	Local level personnel	Total
Support element					
Senior administrative officer		(1) 1			(1) 1
Administrative officer		(1) 1			(1) 1
Personnel		(1) 1	(1) 1		(2) 2
Finance		(1) 1	(1) 2		(2) 3
Transport			(3) 10		(3) 10
Communications			(10) 12		(10) 12
Property control			(2) 4		(2) 4
Procurement and General Service		(2) 2	(13) 19		(15) 21
Security			(2) 2		(2) 2
Secretaries			(8) 8		(8) 8
Secretaries (for military)			(5) 5		(5) 5
Interpreters (local)				(10) 15	(10) 15
Other local personnel				(35) 60	(35) 60
Total support element	0 0	(6) 6	(45) 63	(45) 75	(96) 144
Total Mission staff	(60) 116	(10) 10	(49) 67	(45) 75	(164) 268

a/ Figures in parentheses are the number of staff who would be deployed during the initial phase of the Mission, by 14 November 1991, whereas the figures without parentheses represent full deployment of the proposed number of personnel.

b/ Voluntary contribution by the Government of Australia.

Annex II

Estimates of financial requirements

Serial	Main expenditure group	Nov.-Dec. 91 (2 months) a/	Jan.-Apr. 92 (4 months)	Total (6 months)
		(Thousands of United States dollars)		
1	Military personnel	431.1	733.2	1 164.3
	Estimates cover travel to the Mission area ($259,200), Mission subsistence allowance ($855,100) plus an allowance for compensation payments for service incurred injuries ($50,000) for a total of 76 military personnel, of whom 50 would be military liaison officers, 20 would be part of a mine awareness programme and 6 would be medical personnel b/			
2	Civilian personnel	1 667.9	3 343.7	5 011.6
	Estimates cover gross salaries and common staff costs ($3,491,400) Mission subsistence allowance ($1,272,700), travel to the Mission ($202,500) and other official travel ($45,000) in respect of 77 international staff members and 75 locally recruited staff members			
3	Construction and maintenance of premises, including utilities	389.0	168.0	557.0
	Included under this heading are rental of premises ($165,000), cost of utilities ($45,000), purchase and erection of three prefabricated office/accommodation structures ($293,000), plus funds for general upkeep and maintenance ($54,000)			

Serial	Main expenditure group	Nov.-Dec. 91 (2 months) a/	Jan.-Apr. 92 (4 months)	Total (6 months)
		(Thousands of United States dollars)		
4	Vehicle operations	2 406.0	160.0	2 566.0
	Funds are included for the acquisition of transportation equipment as follows: 18 sedans, 27 four-wheel drive vehicles, 8 minibuses, 2 ambulances, 7 trucks, 10 mine-resistant vehicles, 7 cargo trailers, 2 forklifts and 1 container handler ($2,269,000), various workshop equipment ($50,000), the cost of petrol, oil, lubricants and spare parts ($235,000) and vehicle insurance ($12,000)			
5	Aircraft operation	1 650.7	5 170.4	6 821.1
	Estimates cover the charter of 4 utility helicopters for five months ($4,350,600), including positioning costs, the hire of a helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft as required, for about 55 hours during the initial period ($110,000) plus the charter of a medium-sized cargo aircraft for five months for transport of personnel and resupply ($1,750,000). Also included is the cost of aviation fuel ($565,500), plus ground handling charges and liability insurance ($45,000)			
6	Communications	1 999.0	80.0	2 079.0
	Estimates under this heading cover communications and test equipment ($1,916,000), communications spares and supplies ($80,000) and the cost of commercial communications ($83,000), including user charges for satellite communications and pouch services (excluding the voluntary contribution of the Government of Australia)			

Serial	Main expenditure group	Nov.-Dec. 91 (2 months) a/	Jan.-Apr. 92 (4 months)	Total (6 months)
		(Thousands of United States dollars)		
7	Miscellaneous equipment Estimates cover the purchase of generators ($198,200), office furniture and equipment, including data processing equipment ($238,000), fuel storage tanks and pumps ($140,000), observation equipment ($70,000) and various other equipment ($165,000), including medical and water purification equipment, accommodation equipment for the outstations and refrigerators	831.2	56.0	887.2
8	Supplies and services Estimated expenditures under this heading cover contractual services, medical supplies and services, stationery and office supplies, subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals, sanitation and cleaning materials, uniform items, United Nations flags and decals, electrical supplies, water and petrol jerrycans, plus miscellaneous other supplies and services	149.4	76.0	225.4
9	Freight and related costs Freight charges are mostly covered under the expenditure groups for vehicles and equipment. Additional funds are included hereunder for shipment of supplies and other items for which allowance is not made elsewhere	80.0	60.0	140.0

/...

Serial	Main expenditure group	Nov.-Dec. 91 (2 months) a/	Jan.-Apr. 92 (4 months)	Total (6 months)
		(Thousands of United States dollars)		
10	Support account for peace-keeping operations	141.8	284.2	426.0
	Estimates represent 8.5 per cent of the personnel costs shown under serial 2 above			
	Total of estimates (gross)	9 746.1	10 131.5	19 877.6

a/ Includes a starting-up cost of $6,230,900, covering the cost of vehicles, equipment, initial travel to the Mission of civilian and military personnel, plus positioning cost for the four helicopters to be chartered.

b/ The report of the Secretary-General (S/23097, para. 16) includes the 6 medical personnel in the total of 75 international staff.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23098
30 September 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HAITI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you to convene a meeting of the Security Council immediately to consider the situation in Haiti and its consequences for regional stability.

(Signed) Mr. Fritz E. LONGCHAMP
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Haiti
to the United Nations

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/46/513
S/23099
1 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda items 29 and 68
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 27 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 19 September 1991 from His Excellency Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan, addressed to you.

I have further the honour to request that the text of the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 29 and 68, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khodaidad BASHARMAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 19 September 1991 from the President of Afghanistan addressed to the Secretary-General

Conveying my salutation and best wishes to you, I would like to state that the people and Government of the Republic of Afghanistan highly appreciate your good offices aimed at a political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan.

As you are well aware, your personal efforts and those of your Special Representative aimed at putting an end to one of the most painful conflicts of the present era, which commenced with the mediation of the Geneva negotiations, continued with the constant contacts with the internal and external parties to the conflict and resulted in your recent five-point statement, are an expressive manifestation of your attentive consideration for putting an end to the grief and sorrow of our people.

The support of the people and Government of the Republic of Afghanistan for your good-offices mission has been displayed steadily in our peace proposals, initiatives and practical deeds. As you have witnessed throughout your joint work with the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan, we have made, in good faith, every effort so as to be supportive and cooperative with your endeavours for a political settlement in our country.

In the prevailing situation in which your good offices, together with our own peace-seeking activities towards a political solution and the recent US-Soviet declaration, an important step towards that end, have all boosted the expectation of the Afghan people and that of the international community for the cessation of war and the restoration of peace in our country, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan is of the conviction that the cut-off of weapon supplies to the conflicting parties in Afghanistan solely by the United States and the Soviet Union will not and can not result in the cessation of war. Peace can be attained in Afghanistan only when, in accordance with your statement of 21 May 1991, a transitional period is accompanied by the cessation of hostilities through a cease-fire and an agreement to end arms supplies to all Afghan sides by all the supplying sources. We are also of the opinion that in order to verify a practical termination of arms supplies to Afghanistan, an effective international control mechanism should be worked out in close cooperation with the United Nations.

NAJIBULLAH
President of the Republic
of Afghanistan

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/46/514
S/23100
1 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda items 29 and 68
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 30 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, dated 18 September 1991.

I have further the honour to request that the text of the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 29 and 68, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khodaidad BASHARMAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Statement issued on 18 September 1991 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan

As is well known, the Republic of Afghanistan has supported the five-point statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the recent statement made by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on ending arms supplies to Afghanistan, and has expressed its readiness to contribute to and cooperate in every process resulting in the restoration of peace in the war-stricken land of the people of Afghanistan.

Regrettably, however, the opposition forces and their Pakistani patrons have not only refrained from giving a clearly positive response to the above-mentioned statements but, on the contrary, have intensified their military activities in Afghanistan, particularly in the provinces bordering Pakistan. From the information we have at our disposal, it appears that the opposition forces, in collaboration with and with the direct support of the military circles of Pakistan, have of late noticeably increased the transportation of weapons and ammunitions from Pakistan into the territory of Afghanistan. They have also intensified their armed attacks on a number of provinces bordering Pakistan.

These activities are being carried out at a time when extensive diplomatic efforts for an intra-Afghan dialogue and the rapid termination of war in Afghanistan are in progress. Such activities, being made in flagrant contradiction to the desire of the international community, the statement of the United Nations Secretary-General and the accord made by the two super-Powers for ending the war in Afghanistan, are a graphic manifestation of the determination of the Afghan opposition forces and their Pakistani supporters for the continuation and intensification of war and a crystal-clear defiance of the will of the international community.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan earnestly calls for the termination of such activities and urges that, in lieu of intensifying military operations that will lead to nothing but further killings of innocent people and the destruction of our country, the opposition forces and their Pakistani patrons think sober-mindedly and, by taking a constructive and realistic position, contribute to the implementation of the Secretary-General's statement and the recent declaration of the United States and the Soviet Union on Afghanistan leading to a peaceful, political solution.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan calls seriously upon the international community, the Secretary-General and the super-Powers to utilize their prestige and authority in order to exert pressure on Pakistan to refrain from the intensification of war in Afghanistan, to avoid encouraging the Afghan opposition forces in their war activities and to stop sending deadly weapons into the territory of Afghanistan.

While considering itself committed to the persistent, faithful and unsparing efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the problem in Afghanistan, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan will take every necessary action in order to exercise its legitimate right to defend the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/46/515
S/23101
1 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 31
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY AND PEACE INITIATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 30 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the communiqué issued on 30 September by the Presidents of Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela and the Prime Minister of the Spanish Government concerning the "New York Agreement" on El Salvador (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and the above-mentioned communiqué distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jorge MONTAÑO
Permanent Representative of
Mexico to the United Nations

ANNEX

COMMUNIQUE BY THE PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT

The Presidents of Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela and the Prime Minister of the Spanish Government express their deep satisfaction at the progress achieved since the Guadalajara Summit in putting an end to the armed conflict in El Salvador.

They also express their pleasure at the role played by Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, throughout the process of negotiation which concluded on 25 September 1991 with the signing of the New York Agreement.

They consider it to be of the greatest importance that the Secretary-General of the United Nations continue to exert efforts and to offer his invaluable assistance in the next stage of the process in order thereby to ensure the happy culmination of this effort of reconciliation.

They concur in drawing attention once again to the necessity for the parties to the conflict and all the institutions, political parties and social forces of El Salvador to cooperate unreservedly in the current efforts and to contribute to ensuring that the process is concluded successfully.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23102
1 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement made by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq on 29 September 1991 concerning the nuclear inspection team.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement issued on 29 September 1991 by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq concerning the nuclear inspection team

We had expected that United States and Zionist circles would exploit the contrived and biased mode of behaviour adopted by the inspection team, which is headed by an agent of United States intelligence, David Kay, and which, as is clear from the news media, includes an Israeli agent and other agents, in order to give currency to allegations against the Iraqi nuclear programme dedicated to peaceful purposes within the framework of the concerted campaign of animosity against Iraq. The United States press began that campaign with the allegations published by the American magazine Newsweek before the inspection team in question completed its mission in Iraq.

We reaffirm our statement communicated to the Security Council by the letter dated 25 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Council to the effect that the Iraqi authorities do not and will not acknowledge any document or visual material with respect to which no joint record has been drawn up by the two sides. If an accusation should present itself involving documents or visual materials that have not been entered in the joint record, this would indicate that there is a deliberate intention to do a disservice to Iraq.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23103
1 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 1 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

1. On 29/30 September 1991, United States air activity in Iraqi airspace amounted to 37 sorties flown by 16 two-aircraft formations, one four-aircraft formation and one single aircraft at a speed of 720 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,000 to 8,000 metres.

2. The flights centred over the areas of Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Sinjar, Amadiyah and Rawanduz and were for the purpose of observation and provocation.

3. At 1050 hours on the same day, a formation consisting of four Tornado aircraft overflew Firnas airfield at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 1,500 metres.

4. At 1100 hours on the same day, a two-aircraft formation overflew Tall'afar airfield at a low altitude, and, at 1615 hours, a four-aircraft formation again overflew the same airfield at a low altitude also.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-32190 3328a (E)

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23104
1 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINA, FRANCE, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

We have the honour to enclose the text of the statement issued following the meeting which you held on 27 September 1991 with our Ministers of Foreign Affairs. We should be grateful if you would arrange for it to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) LI Daoyu
Permanent Representative of
China to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) Yuli M. VORONTSOV
Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United Nations

(Signed) David HANNAY
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

(Signed) Thomas R. PICKERING
Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the
the United Nations

Annex

Statement issued on 27 September 1991 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five permanent members of the Security Council following a meeting with the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese/English/ French/Russian]

On 27 September 1991, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the five permanent members of the Security Council were the guests at a luncheon given by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Taking part were the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China H.E. Mr. Qian Qichen; the Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France H.E. Mr. Roland Dumas; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics H.E. Mr. Boris D. Pankin; the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland H.E. Mr. Douglas Hurd; and the Secretary of State of the United States of America H.E. Mr. James A. Baker III.

The Ministers paid tribute to the Secretary-General for his distinguished service to the United Nations during his 10 years at the head of the Organization. They affirmed that his integrity and dedication to the principles of the Charter had contributed in large measure to the high standing which the Organization enjoys, especially with regard to the resolution of regional conflicts.

The Ministers, meeting the Secretary-General in continuation of their close consultation as permanent members of the Security Council, noted that the rapid changes which had taken place on the international scene over the past year were reflected in positive changes in the role of the United Nations. They reaffirmed that a revitalized United Nations had a central and increasingly important part to play in international affairs, in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and in creating a new international order. They agreed to make preventive diplomacy a top priority, and to work for a reinforcement of the Organization's role in peace-keeping and peacemaking. In this connection they welcomed the extension of the United Nations peace-keeping activities over the past year in Angola, Western Sahara and Central America and on the Iraq/Kuwait border, and undertook to give these and other such operations their full and continuing support.

The Ministers and the Secretary-General reviewed the role of the Security Council in bringing about the restoration of Kuwait's independence and sovereignty, and in dealing with the continuing consequences of Iraq's aggression. The Ministers agreed that the events in the Gulf over the past year showed that the Security Council could be effective in upholding international law when it remained firm in its resolve. They regard as

unacceptable the pattern of persistent Iraqi non-compliance with resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions of the Security Council inter alia over Iraq's programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction, and in particular Iraq's obstruction of United Nations inspection teams and defiance of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). They reaffirmed their determination to secure Iraq's full and scrupulous compliance with these and all other relevant resolutions in order to bring about the Council's objective of restoring international peace and security in the area and to ensure that the humanitarian needs of all segments of the Iraqi population are met.

The Ministers welcomed the efforts of all the parties concerned to work for the early convening of a peace conference on the Middle East to launch direct negotiations, with the United Nations Secretary-General sending an observer and also with the Gulf Cooperation Council sending its Secretary-General as an observer, under the co-sponsorship of the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with the European Community sending a representative. They urged all parties to cooperate in resolving the outstanding issues so that an active negotiating process can get under way leading to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. They reaffirmed that negotiations should be based on resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council and should take into account the right to security for all States in the region, including Israel, and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.

The Ministers expressed their deep concern over the situation in Yugoslavia and its regional repercussions. They welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 713 (1991) by the Security Council. They appreciated the efforts undertaken by the member States of the European Community, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia and expressed their hope that the latest endeavours of Lord Carrington will help to consolidate the cease-fire and thus pave the way for the successful outcome of the Conference on Yugoslavia.

The Ministers welcomed the progress made in recent months towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict on the basis of the Framework worked out by the five permanent members of the Security Council, and in particular the formation of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, the election of H.E. Prince Norodom Sihanouk as its Chairman and the successful operation of the Council under his Chairmanship, as well as the institution of a cease-fire by the Cambodian parties. They noted with satisfaction the successful outcome of the meetings held on 20 to 21 September in New York by the five permanent members, members of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, the two Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the Coordinating Committee of the Paris Conference. The Ministers welcomed the intention to reconvene the Paris Conference for the signature at the end of October or early in November of agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict, which will involve an important role for the United Nations.

The Ministers reiterated their full support of the Secretary-General's Statement on Afghanistan of 21 May 1991 laying down basic principles of a political settlement in that country. They welcomed the US-Soviet Joint Statement on Afghanistan issued on 13 September 1991 and the agreement of the USSR and USA to discontinue their weapons deliveries to all Afghan sides from 1 January 1992 as a major step to bring about a cessation of hostilities and facilitate launching an intra-Afghan negotiating process which should lead, with active United Nations involvement, to the establishment of a broad-based government through a free and fair electoral process. They call on all the Governments and parties concerned to cooperate with these efforts, and in particular with the Secretary-General, in order to promote a political settlement in Afghanistan. The Ministers expressed the hope that early efforts be made to resolve humanitarian questions including the plight of Afghan refugees and Soviet POWs.

The Ministers welcomed the signature on 25 September by representatives of the Government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation of the "New York Accords". They congratulated the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela on the success of their efforts. They expressed the hope that the negotiations due to resume on 12 October would lead to rapid progress towards the resolution of all outstanding problems. They call on the parties to continue to show restraint and to cooperate fully with ONUSAL.

The Ministers also reviewed with the Secretary-General certain other current regional disputes, and expressed full support for his continuing efforts. They urge all parties to the Western Sahara conflict to contribute to the full and timely implementation of the Secretary-General's settlement plan. They call upon all parties to the Cyprus dispute to extend the fullest cooperation to the Secretary-General at this crucial time in resolving outstanding differences, enabling significant progress to be made towards a viable and just resolution of this long-standing problem. They believe that all parties should work to ensure the convening of a high-level international meeting in New York under the aegis of the Secretary-General.

The Ministers noted with satisfaction the movement towards the dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa and expressed the hope that this process will be accelerated.

The Ministers thanked the Secretary-General for his invitation to their meeting, which had once again offered an opportunity for a timely and constructive exchange of views.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23105
2 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 2 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF PANAMA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Panama to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to apprise him of Resolution No. 22 of the Legislative Assembly of Panama, adopted on 1 October 1991, relating to the situation in Haiti.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Panama would appreciate it if the Secretary-General would have the text of this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex

RESOLUTION NO. 22

(1 October 1991)

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL POWERS; AND

CONSIDERING:

That on 29 September of this year the armed forces of Haiti, in violation of the Haitian Constitution, overthrew the President of the Republic, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in a treacherous coup d'état;

That this violent break with the recently initiated process of democratization of the Haitian State casts a pall over hopes for peace, justice and development, which can only be attained through representative democrary;

That the coup d'état in Haiti is a step backward in the current process of dawning democracy in Latin America, which for decades suffered terror, injustice and death under dictatorial regimes, both civilian and military;

That it is the duty of this Assembly to see to it that the will of the people, as expressed at the polls, is respected;

NOW THEREFORE RESOLVES:

1. To condemn strongly the coup d'état against democracy in Haiti and against the President of the Republic, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

2. To demand that the national Government should invoke the Bethancourt doctrine against the military Government of Haiti.

3. To exhort the international community not to recognize the illegitimate military Government of Haiti.

4. To express its support for, solidarity with and appreciation to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Haitian people.

5. To send a copy of this resolution to the Executive Branch, and to the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Latin American Parliament and the media.

FOR TRANSMITTAL AND PUBLICATION

Done at Panama City on the first day of October, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-one.

(Signed) Marco A. Ameglio S.
President

(Signed) Rubén Arosemena Valdés
Secretary-General

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23106
2 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

(for the period 9 April to 2 October 1991)

Introduction

1. By paragraph 5 of its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the Security Council established a demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border and decided to set up an observer unit with the following tasks: to monitor the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway and the demilitarized zone; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; and to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State into the other. By its resolution 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991, the Security Council approved my report on the implementation of the above provisions (S/22454 and Add.1-3); noted that the decision to set up the observer unit had been taken in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) and could only be terminated by the Council's decision; and decided to review the question of termination or continuation as well as the modalities of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) every six months.

2. The purpose of the present report is to provide the Security Council, prior to its review, with an overview of the first six months of UNIKOM activities. It also updates my reports of 9 May (S/22580), 12 June (S/22692) and 3 September 1991 (S/23000), which covered the greater part of the reporting period in some detail.

Setting up of UNIKOM in the field

3. The setting up of UNIKOM in the field began with the arrival of the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Günther G. Greindl, and his advance party in the mission area on 13 April. The advance party comprising military observers temporarily assigned from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and civilian staff. Over the following three weeks, UNIKOM conducted a thorough reconnaissance of its assigned zone, developed a deployment plan, organized its transport, set up a communications network, developed its lines of supply and provided training and familiarization for the incoming

personnel. UNIKOM deployment was completed on 6 May. UNIKOM then monitored the withdrawal of the armed forces that were still deployed in its assigned zone. That withdrawal having been completed, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) established by the Security Council came into effect at 2000 hours Greenwich mean time (GMT) on 9 May 1991.

Organization

4. At the beginning of October 1991, UNIKOM comprised the following personnel:

Military observers

Argentina	7	Nigeria	7
Austria	7	Norway	8
Bangladesh	7	Pakistan	9
Canada	1	Poland	7
China	20	Romania	7
Denmark	7	Senegal	7
Fiji	8	Singapore	7
Finland	7	Sweden	8
France	20	Thailand	7
Ghana	8	Turkey	7
Greece	7	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	20
Hungary	7	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	16
India	8	United States of America	19
Indonesia	7	Uruguay	8
Ireland	8	Venezuela	7
Italy	6		
Kenya	8		
Malaysia	8		
		Total	295

Administrative and logistic support

Engineers (Canada)	292
Logistics (Sweden)	30
Movement control/post (Denmark)	19
Helicopters (Chile)	50
Medical (Norway)	50
Total	441

UNIKOM includes also 177 civilian staff, of whom 106 are United Nations staff and 71 are locally recruited. Two small fixed-wing aircraft contributed by the Government of Switzerland are operated by civilians. In addition, UNIKOM had the use of chartered aircraft for the movement of troops and equipment and for communications between Baghdad and Kuwait. The Government of Sweden provided free airlift at the beginning of the mission.

5. The plan for UNIKOM, which was formulated in the first days of April, took into account the uncertainties existing at the time and the risks that might arise. For this reason, three infantry companies (Fiji, Ghana, Nepal) from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and two infantry companies (Austria and Denmark) from the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) were temporarily assigned to UNIKOM to provide security. Fortunately the risks perceived in early April did not materialize, and by the end of June the infantry companies returned to their parent missions, as did a logistic company (Sweden) that had also been temporarily detached from UNIFIL.

6. Logistic support for the Mission was difficult at first because the war had resulted in the destruction or severe disruption of the infrastructure in the area. UNIKOM, therefore, relied on substantial support provided by the United States Army and by the forces of other Member States cooperating with Kuwait. The Governments of Iraq and Kuwait also gave support to UNIKOM. The situation has since improved and UNIKOM now has its full complement of transport and communications equipment, much of which came from the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). For most of the period, and especially during the summer, living conditions in the DMZ were austere and very demanding, the military personnel being accommodated under canvas. The provision of air-conditioned prefabricated trailers in September has improved conditions greatly. The Mission was launched from and is being supplied through Kuwait, which has the international airport nearest to the DMZ.

7. A serious hazard from the beginning was the large number of mines and unexploded ordnance left over from the war. UNIKOM engineers cleared some 1,100 kilometres of patrol track and the sites for observation posts, camps and helicopter pads and disposed of some 7,000 mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance. The engineers also carried out construction work on the various camp facilities and on the future headquarters at Umm Qasr. There will be a continuing requirement for explosive ordnance demolition and the maintenance of patrol tracks and facilities in the DMZ. In addition, the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, established under paragraph 3 of resolution 687 (1991), will require significant engineer support. Provision of this has already begun through the clearing of sites and the placing of preliminary survey markers. So far, 121 out of a projected 165 markers have been placed.

8. As I informed the Security Council in my letter of 6 August 1991 (S/22916), a number of adjustments are being made to the logistic support elements. For the reasons mentioned above, 85 engineers will be retained in UNIKOM but their number will be further reduced when the work in support of the Boundary Demarcation Commission has been completed (see S/22916).

Further, the Swedish logistic unit, which was made available for six months only, will be withdrawn. Its tasks and that of the movement control staff will be consolidated in one unit of 45 all ranks, which will be provided by Denmark. Finally, the size of the medical unit will be reduced from 50 to 20. These adjustments will be carried out in the next weeks.

9. With the agreement of the Security Council, I have postponed the reduction in the number of military observers that I had intended to effect (S/22977 and S/22978). I shall keep this matter under review and revert to the Council when appropriate.

10. UNIKOM headquarters was initially located south of Kuwait City in a hotel annex made available by the Government of Kuwait. In June, the headquarters moved temporarily to the logistic base at Doha. Work continues at the future headquarters at Umm Qasr to make it habitable.

11. Major-General Greindl and his senior staff have maintained close contact and held regular meetings with the authorities at Baghdad and Kuwait City. In addition, the UNIKOM liaison staff were in daily contact with their Iraqi and Kuwaiti counterparts. UNIKOM maintains liaison offices at Baghdad and Kuwait City. Local liaison with the Iraqi authorities is also effected through an Iraqi liaison office at Umm Qasr.

Demilitarized zone

12. The DMZ is about 200 kilometres long, to which must be added the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway, with a length of about 40 kilometres. For the most part, the DMZ is barren and almost uninhabited, except for the towns of Umm Qasr and Safwan. There are airfields at Safwan and Umm Qasr and a port at Umm Qasr. A number of roads cross the DMZ, most of them in the eastern part, but the terrain makes cross-country travel easy, and there are numerous tracks, especially in the central and southern sectors. There are few features in the terrain and it is easy to mistake one's location by a wide margin. It is also easy to mistake the location of the border, which remains to be marked.

13. When UNIKOM arrived in the area, a large number of displaced persons were in the Safwan area. Most of these were moved prior to the establishment of the DMZ, and only a small number remain at the Abdali camp on Kuwaiti territory south of Safwan.

Deployment and concept of operations

14. For operational purposes, UNIKOM has divided the DMZ into three sectors. Each sector has a headquarters and six observation posts/patrol bases. UNIKOM enjoys full freedom of movement throughout the DMZ. The deployment of UNIKOM is shown on the attached map.

15. UNIKOM's concept of operations, which has been further refined during recent months, places emphasis on mobile patrols in order to observe the length and breadth of the DMZ. The fixed observation posts serve as patrol bases from which the military observers patrol their assigned sectors and visit temporary observation points established in areas of particular activity or where roads and tracks enter the DMZ. In addition to the patrols, all other movements, supply runs for example, are also used for observation; investigation teams are frequently dispatched. Observation on the ground is supplemented by air patrols, using helicopters and the two fixed-wing aircraft. Again, all other flights are also used for observation.

Violations and complaints

16. Since the DMZ came into effect on 9 May, UNIKOM has observed three types of violations: minor incursions on the ground by small groups of soldiers, often just one or two; overflights by military aircraft; and the carrying by policemen of weapons other than sidearms. The largest number of ground incursions, 65, occurred in the month immediately after the establishment of the DMZ. UNIKOM then put up signs on the main roads and tracks to mark entry into the DMZ; after that, the number of ground incursions dropped significantly. The overflights were by military aircraft of a type used by the forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait and, since early September, also of a type used by Kuwait.

17. In order to reduce the risk of incidents and as envisaged from the outset (S/22454, para. 6), UNIKOM obtained the agreement of the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait that their police operating in the DMZ would carry only sidearms. Both sides have expressed misgivings about this limitation, pointing out that smugglers and other elements with whom the police have to contend are generally armed with rifles and light machine-guns. UNIKOM has observed a number of violations by both sides, including cases in which policemen have kept rifles out of sight in their posts and vehicles.

18. The following table summarizes the violations observed by UNIKOM:

	Iraq				Kuwait/allied forces			
	Ground	Air	Police weapons	Total	Ground	Air	Police weapons	Total
10 May-9 June	8	-	-	8	57	29	-	86
10 June-9 July	4	-	-	4	29	28	-	57
10 July-9 August	1	-	6	7	9	9	6	24
10 August-9 September	5	-	4	9	13	13	1	27
10 September-2 October	-	-	1	1	6	7	3	16
Total	18	-	11	29	114	86	10	210

/...

All violations were raised in writing with the party concerned, with a view to preventing a recurrence.

19. During the reporting period, UNIKOM received 28 written complaints from Iraq and 10 from Kuwait. It investigated those complaints and was able in 13 cases to establish the facts through its own observation. The results of the investigations were conveyed to the party concerned.

Other matters

20. One of the purposes of UNIKOM is to deter violations of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait through its presence in, and surveillance of, the DMZ. Pending demarcation of the boundary, UNIKOM has not taken a position concerning its precise location. UNIKOM uses a British map, which it has given to both sides for reference. They have agreed to work with it as a practical arrangement to facilitate UNIKOM's task and without prejudice to their positions concerning the boundary.

21. In order to avoid friction and incidents, UNIKOM has established the principle that the Iraqi and Kuwaiti authorities, including police, should stay a reasonable distance of 1,000 metres from the boundary line shown on UNIKOM maps. It is not intended that this should lead to the creation of a no-man's land. The authorities retain the right to carry out their functions throughout their respective parts of the DMZ, except that they are expected to consult UNIKOM in advance if those functions should require them to approach closer than 1,000 metres to the boundary line shown on UNIKOM's map. Such consultation enables UNIKOM to take measures to avoid incidents.

22. Two main problems have arisen in this regard. First, the removal from storage at Umm Qasr of 11 "HY-2G" missiles and later 4 further missiles of the same type. I informed the Security Council of this matter on 5 July. UNIKOM took it up with the Iraqi authorities, who have since returned 4 of the missiles to the storage at Umm Qasr but not the other 11.

23. Secondly, Iraq has deployed 4 border police centres and 10 border police posts in the DMZ. Five of the posts are on the Kuwaiti side of the boundary line shown on the UNIKOM map; two are closer to it than 1,000 metres, on the Iraqi side. Lengthy and intensive efforts have been made at United Nations Headquarters as well as in the field to persuade Iraq to move the seven posts further back. However, the Iraqi authorities have maintained that they had been in place before 2 August 1990 and that they would not be pulled back because of the political implications. The Iraqi authorities have assured UNIKOM that Iraq will comply with the reasonable distance principle, once the boundary is demarcated. UNIKOM has recently observed harbour and local police at Umm Qasr, and the Iraqi authorities have indicated that they intend to deploy more policemen in the DMZ. They have undertaken to consult UNIKOM in advance of such deployment.

24. For its part, Kuwait has established five police posts and one police observation point in the DMZ. The Kuwaiti authorities have been in touch with UNIKOM about the locations of these posts and of additional posts which they plan to set up. They have also reiterated their willingness to comply with the reasonable distance principle if the Iraqi authorities do so as well.

25. In accordance with the plan approved by the Security Council in its resolution 689 (1991), UNIKOM requires that it be informed in advance of the movement of ships through the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway (see S/22454, para. 6). In September, UNIKOM observed movements by an Iraqi pilot ship and a maintenance ship between Umm Qasr and the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway. UNIKOM had not been informed of these movements and raised them with the Iraqi authorities, who have since complied with the UNIKOM notification requirement.

26. In the course of August, tension rose as a result of incursions from Iraq into Kuwaiti territory by persons collecting weapons, ammunition and other battlefield items. These persons, and others similarly engaged in the Iraqi part of the DMZ, were dressed in civilian clothes and used civilian vehicles. The question has been raised whether they are in fact military personnel but UNIKOM has not been able to establish that this is so. It has, however, been informed by the Iraqi authorities that they offer rewards to persons who retrieve weapons and ammunition from the battlefield. It has also had indications that there is an unofficial market for such items in Iraq. In addition to its own observations, UNIKOM has been informed by the Kuwaiti authorities of such incursions and of arrests they have made. One such incident investigated by UNIKOM occurred on 28 August, when the Kuwaiti Coast Guard took 12 small vessels and detained 45 Iraqis off the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan. I reported on these matters on 3 September (S/23000, paras. 12-14). Subsequently such incursions subsided. However, on 30 September and 1 October, UNIKOM observed in its southern sector Iraqis collecting mines on the Kuwaiti side of the line shown on the UNIKOM map, at a minefield that straddles that line.

27. In the Iraqi part of the DMZ the collection of military equipment and ammunition has continued. Recently, mines and unexploded ordnance have also been lifted. It is evident that there are persons engaged in this dangerous activity who are not trained for it; there have been numerous casualties and to UNIKOM's knowledge at least 16 persons have died during the last 10 days. Many of the casualties were brought to UNIKOM posts, from where they were evacuated by helicopter and treated by UNIKOM's medical staff. UNIKOM raised this matter with the Iraqi authorities on humanitarian grounds. On 2 October 1991, the Iraqi authorities informed UNIKOM that they had issued strict instructions to the police to stop civilians from collecting mines in the DMZ. It is hoped therefore that the problems described in this and the preceding paragraph will not recur.

28. I have reported previously about the so-called "sheep market", an illegal market where alcohol and arms are traded as well as livestock (S/23000, para. 11). That market has recently moved to a location astride the boundary line in the southern sector. On 15 September, UNIKOM received a complaint

from the Kuwaiti liaison staff with the request that it investigate an incident in which 80 armed men from the market had allegedly attacked a Kuwaiti police post with rifles and rocket-propelled grenades and had taken two policemen hostage. The UNIKOM team investigating the incident found no evidence of damage to the police cabins or vehicles, and established that the two missing policemen had been on an errand in Kuwait City. At the sheep market, the traders stated that they had approached the police post to borrow water but the policemen had opened fire, killing one. The UNIKOM team found that man's body some 20 metres from the police post and at the sheep market was shown a water truck with numerous bullet holes.

Financial aspects

29. Should the Security Council continue the mandate of UNIKOM beyond 8 October 1991, the cost of maintaining the Mission for a period of six months would be approximately $40 million, based on the continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities. The resources needed for maintaining UNIKOM beyond 8 October 1991 will be sought from the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session. In the event that the mandate is extended beyond six months, the Secretary-General will report to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and to the General Assembly during its forty-seventh session on the additional resources needed.

Observations

30. During the last six months, UNIKOM deployed in its area of operation and carried out its tasks pursuant to the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 687 (1991) and in accordance with the implementation plan approved by the Council in its resolution 689 (1991). The DMZ established by the Security Council has been generally respected and the area has been calm. UNIKOM has thus served the purpose for which it was created and, in the light of all the circumstances, I recommend that the Security Council maintain it in the area for a further six-month period.

31. As indicated by the table in paragraph 18 above, there have been rather few violations due to ground incursions by military personnel into the DMZ and their frequency has been falling. The main source of friction during the period under review has been the movement of persons from Iraq to Kuwait across a border which remains to be demarcated. Given Kuwait's recent experience, these unauthorized border crossings have understandably given cause for concern to the Kuwaiti authorities, who have frequently raised them with UNIKOM.

32. Some of these border crossings are by bedouins and reflect a longstanding practice which has been countenanced by both sides in the past. Others are attributable to the suppliers and customers of the illegal sheep market, which itself changes location from time to time in the border area. These movements are of some concern to UNIKOM because of the violent incidents to which they

sometimes give rise and because those associated with the sheep market are armed with, and trade in, weapons of a higher calibre than those which the police of either side are permitted to carry in the DMZ. This is essentially a law and order problem, which UNIKOM has drawn to the attention of both Governments.

33. A third category of border crossings is caused by persons from Iraq who have penetrated deep into Kuwait in search of weapons, ammunition and other battlefield items. As far as UNIKOM has been able to ascertain, these persons are civilians attracted by the prices which such items fetch, from official or unofficial purchasers, in Iraq. Again, UNIKOM has raised this matter with the Iraqi authorities both because of the tension to which it can give rise and, on humanitarian grounds, because of the carnage suffered by the persons who engage in this very dangerous practice (see para. 27 above).

34. UNIKOM's responsibilities vis-à-vis unauthorized border crossings in these various categories have been misunderstood in some quarters. When UNIKOM first deployed it encountered the widely held expectation in the area that it would assume overall responsibility in the DMZ and police it. In the same vein, it was often referred to as the "United Nations forces". To some extent, these expectations have persisted. It is therefore worth repeating that UNIKOM has been constituted as an observation mission and does not have the authority, under the terms of resolution 689 (1991), to assume law enforcement functions. Nor does it have the capacity to do so; the military observers are unarmed and the armed infantry elements have been withdrawn.

35. The continued presence of Iraqi police posts on the Kuwaiti side of the line shown on UNIKOM's map remains a matter of concern. I have instructed the Chief Military Observer of UNIKOM to persevere in his efforts to have these police posts pulled back behind the line.

36. UNIKOM has functioned well, with the cooperation of the parties. Its concept of operations has proven adequate to the task and Major-General Greindl is confident that UNIKOM would detect any significant military movement in or close to the DMZ. With additional experience, the UNIKOM operations will be further refined. There is, however, one aspect of its modalities that seems to require early improvement. This relates to its observation capability, particularly when the weather conditions limit visibility and make air surveillance difficult. Such difficulties cannot be overcome by increasing the number of military observers; UNIKOM is very adequately staffed. Electronic instruments, especially radar, would seem to provide the only means of ensuring continuous observation throughout the DMZ. General Greindl has made a recommendation to this effect, which is now being studied, taking into account financial as well as operational considerations.

37. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments that have contributed personnel to UNIKOM and have provided support in other practical forms. I also wish to pay tribute to Major-General Greindl, to his military and civilian staff, to the military observers and to the soldiers of the support units for the skill and dedication with which they have carried out their tasks in difficult conditions.



MAP NO. 3637 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
OCTOBER 1991

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23106/Add.1
4 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

Addendum

1. In paragraph 27 of my report of 2 October 1991 (S/23106) on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), I informed the Security Council that on that day the Iraqi authorities had issued strict instructions to their police to stop civilians from collecting mines in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). However, the Chief Military Observer has since reported that on 2 October 1991 at least 60 Iraqi civilians, with 8 trucks and 40 pick-up vehicles, were observed by UNIKOM collecting mines at a location 15 kilometres south of observation post S-3. Most of the activity was on the Kuwaiti side of the border, both inside and outside the DMZ. Iraqi police, when contacted by UNIKOM observers, said that they had no orders to stop the collection of mines.

2. On 3 October 1991, no mine collecting activity was observed by UNIKOM. On 4 October, however, the Mission observed a resumption of such activity. Some 50 Iraqi civilians, with 13 trucks and 9 pick-up vehicles, were again observed collecting mines 15 kilometres south of observation post S-3. Once more, they were in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti parts of the DMZ, as well as in Kuwaiti territory outside it. Also, three trucks loaded with mines and four pick-up vehicles with some 30 civilians were observed travelling south at the edge of the DMZ in Kuwait territory, approximately 16 kilometres north-east of observation post S-4.

3. On 3 October 1991 the Chief Military Observer again raised the matter with the Iraqi authorities at Baghdad. He urged them to take immediate action to stop any civilian from crossing the border into Kuwait and, in general, to prevent civilians from undertaking this dangerous practice. The Iraqi authorities expressed astonishment that it was still continuing and assured the Chief Military Observer that strict instructions had been given to the police authorities to prevent mine collecting by civilians. They said that they would take urgent measures to rectify the situation. They also requested UNIKOM to provide them with all dates and locations when Iraqi civilians had

been observed collecting mines in the DMZ. This information was delivered in writing today, 4 October 1991.

4. I have instructed the Chief Military Observer to continue to follow this matter closely and I shall keep the Security Council informed, as necessary.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23107
2 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

After the consultations held on 2 October 1991, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the media on behalf of the members in connection with the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait":

"The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 2 October 1991 pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991).

"After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations, the President of the Council concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for a modification of the regime established in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), as referred to in paragraph 21 of that resolution."

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23108
24 September 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait at its 49th meeting, held on 19 September 1991, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 712 (1991), decided to authorize, pursuant to paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 706 (1991), the release by the Secretary-General from the escrow account of the first one-third portion of the sum referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 712 (1991), that is, of 1.6 billion United States dollars, such release to take place as required subject to the availability of funds in the account and, in the case of payments to finance the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs which have been notified or approved in accordance with existing procedures, subject to compliance with the procedures laid down in the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/23006 as approved by paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 712 (1991).

(Signed) Peter HOHENFELLNER
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait